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1Abstract
The well known economic advantage of tradable permits over command
and control obviously vanishes if ﬁrms do not trade because of regulatory
uncertainty. In fact, uncertainty about political decision changes in the per-
mits program could make ﬁrms reluctant to participate in tradable permits
markets. Based on a two-period partial equilibrium framework, our results
suggest that the banking provisions may be used as a tool of policy risk con-
trol and that it is possible to deﬁne optimal risk sharing rules in order to
respond to political decision changes. Finally, our empirical discussion at-
tempts to put the theoretical results concerning ﬁrms’ banking and pooling
behaviors in the context of the recent development of the European Union
Emisions Trading scheme (EU ETS).
Key words : Firm behavior; Tradable permits; Policy risk; EU ETS
JEL Codes : D21, D80, Q58
21 Introduction
Pollution permits are now widely considered as eﬃcient instruments for reg-
ulating the emissions of pollutants by ﬁrms. Their numerous advantages
have been extensively discussed in the literature (Bohm and Russel (1985),
Pearce and Turner (1990), Cropper and Oates (1992), Koutstaal (1997), Bau-
mol and Oates (1998)). However, pollution permits may also convey a high
level of uncertainty with respect to political decisions enforced by the regu-
lator. While in the case of a tax the political uncertainty concerns the level
of the tax, in the case of a pollution permit uncertainty depends not only on
its price but also on allocation rules enforced by the regulator.
Hence, the informational eﬃciency argument1 in favor of pollution per-
mits compared to other classic instruments2 vanishes given this potential
higher level of uncertainty at the ﬁrm-level linked to the risk of political
decision changes3. To cope with these political uncertainties, a number of
ﬁrms may not participate in the permits market and express their fear of an
environmental regulation system dependent on such shifts in the regulatory
environment (Wossink and Gardebroek (2006)).
Hahn (1989) ﬁrst stressed the potential negative eﬀects of political uncer-
tainties of pollution permits systems. He emphasizes that the advantages of
permits schemes in terms of pollution control may be undermined by polit-
ical uncertainties regarding banking and trading provisions. Leston (1992),
Stavins (1995) and Ben-David et al. (1999) have also underlined that the
performance of pollution permits is critically linked to the clarity of political
decisions.
1i.e. less information is needed concerning ﬁrms’ depolluting costs.
2For instance, a tax or a lump sum.
3Be it concerning the global permits allocation or its repartition between ﬁrms.
3In this article, we examine ﬁrms’ production decisions subject to the
introduction of a pollution permits market as an environmental regulation
tool and to the possibility to bank permits forward in a partial equilibrium
framework. At the beginning of each period, ﬁrms receive an initial permits
allocation. Without uncertainty on the next period allocation, ﬁrms smooth
their emissions between trading periods as already documented in the lit-
erature (Rubin (1996), Kling and Rubin (1997), Leiby and Rubin (2001)).
Departing from this benchmark case, the introduction of uncertainty on fu-
ture allocation provides incentives for ﬁrms to bank permits and thus to
reduce their emissions of pollutants. This banking behavior also changes the
temporal pattern of emissions by decreasing the concentration of emissions
on early periods4. Since it overcomes potential negative eﬀects, the autho-
rization of banking therefore appears as a decisive feature for the successful
implementation of permits systems5.
The central question we address is the following: will an increase in the
level of uncertainty concerning future allocation impact positively or nega-
tively the amount of banking by ﬁrms? We aim at detailing ﬁrms’ behavior
following a variation in the level of uncertainty and whether it is possible to
identify an optimal risk sharing rule between ﬁrms. That is why we choose
to focus our analysis on the banking provisions and consider that permits
trading between ﬁrms has already occurred.
Compared to previous literature, the main theoretical results of this arti-
cle are threefold. First, we show that when ﬁrms face an increase in the level
of risk, the variation of the amount of banked permits is linked to the third
derivative of the production function with respect to emissions. This result
4This behavior applies especially for ﬁrms with high abatement costs.
5See Bosetti et al. (2008) for an empirical discussion.
4is close to the notion of prudence derived by Kimball (1990). Second, if the
goods used in the production function are complements (substitutes), ﬁrms
increase (decrease) their inputs consumption as a response to this increase in
the risk level. Third, without uncertainty on the total number of permits al-
located during the second period, an agency may introduce a Pareto-optimal
permits re-allocation between ﬁrms. When the regulatory uncertainty con-
cerns the number of permits available during the second period, an optimal
risk-sharing rule needs to take into account the sensitivity of ﬁrms’ marginal
productivity to the number of permits, as well as the elasticity of the marginal
productivity with respect to the stock of pollution.
Finally, we provide empirical insights into these ﬁndings by investigating
the banking behavior at the installation level and the pooling behavior at the
group level in the light of the emerging European carbon market. We conﬁrm
the impact of diﬀerent allocation rules and overall regulatory uncertainty on
the variation of ﬁrms’ banked permits, and the existence of risks-pooling by
parent companies to save penalty and permits purchases costs.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 details
the behavior of ﬁrms. Section 3 examines risk management strategies be-
tween ﬁrms and proposes an optimal risk sharing rule. Section 4 provides an
empirical discussion. Section 5 concludes.
2 Behavior of Firms
We analyze in this section the behavior of ﬁrms with a two-period time-
horizon for production decisions. Since we focus on the eﬀects of uncertainty
on ﬁrms’ banking behavior, we thus assume that permit trading between
ﬁrms has already occurred. During the ﬁrst period, t, ﬁrms receive a permits
5allocation noted ¯ Pt. This initial allocation may be used for production, but
also banked for the next period. During the second period, ﬁrms receive a
permits allocation noted ¯ Pt+1.
During each period, each ﬁrm produces a good with a given production
technology by using Xt input6and Pt pollution permits. Thus, following the
introduction of pollution permits at time t, each ﬁrm uses a quantity of
environment Pt additional to its input quantity Xt in order to produce a
good Yt:
Yt = F(Xt,Pt) (1)
The quantity of environment Pt simply states the number of pollution
permits needed by the ﬁrm to produce and cover its pollutant emissions
level. The production function is strictly concave for each of its arguments
and the second non-crossed derivatives are negative (Fii < 0).
2.1 Behavior of Firms without Uncertainty
The ﬁrm maximizes its intertemporal proﬁt as a function of its inputs, Xt and
Xt+1, and the choice of using pollution permits Pt and Pt+1. Let ¯ Pt and ¯ Pt+1
be the permits allocated to ﬁrms and St the permits bank computed as the
diﬀerence between the initial permits endowment and the number of permits
used by the ﬁrm7, St = ¯ Pt −Pt. During the second period, the ﬁrm may use
6Xt can be a vector of inputs, i.e. Xt = {X1
t ,...,Xk
t with k ≥ 1. To ease the presenta-
tion, we consider the case where k = 1.
7In this article, we only consider the possibility to bank permits, i.e. at non-negative
levels of St. If St < 0, then the ﬁrm would be allowed to borrow permits. Note that
relaxing the non-negativity constraint on borrowing does not change qualitatively the
results obtained.
6its permits endowment plus its permits bank accumulated during the ﬁrst
period. Noting β the discounting factor used by the ﬁrm, the intertemporal
proﬁt may be written as:
Πt = πt + βπt+1
with πt = F(Xt,Pt) − RtXt and πt+1 = F(Xt+1,Pt+1) − Rt+1Xt+1 +
qt+1( ¯ Pt+1 + St − Pt+1) with Rt and Rt+1 the inputs prices, qt and qt+1 the
pollution permits prices.














With Pt = ¯ Pt − St, the ﬁrst order conditions are:
FXt(Xt,Pt) = Rt (2)
FXt+1(Xt+1,Pt+1) = Rt+1 (3)
FPt(Xt,Pt) − βqt+1 ≤ 0 ;= 0 if St > 0 (4)
FPt+1(Xt+1,Pt+1) − qt+1 = 0 (5)
From eq.(4), we know that the ﬁrm will bank permits if the marginal cost
of banking is inferior to the anticipated permits price. Combining eq.(4) and
(5), we have:
FPt(Xt,Pt) = βFPt+1(Xt+1,Pt+1) (6)
From eq.(2), (3) and (6), we obtain the eﬀects of the variation of the
7number of permits allocated on the ﬁrm’s banking behavior during either of
the two trading periods. Banking is an increasing function of the ﬁrst period
permits allocation, dSt/d ¯ Pt > 0, and a decreasing function of the second
period permits allocation, dSt/d ¯ Pt+1 < 0. When the number of permits
allocated during the ﬁrst period increases, the ﬁrm may increase both the
number of permits banked and used, thereby also increasing its present and
future production levels. When the number of permits allocated during the
second period increases, the ﬁrm may increase its production level during
both trading periods by using more permits during the second period and
banking less during the ﬁrst period.
In this section, we have developed the basic model underlying our analysis.
In the next section, we study the eﬀects of introducing uncertainty on the
number of permits allocated during the second period.
2.2 Behavior of Firms under Uncertainty
In this section, we assume a random second period permits allocation, noted
˜ Pt+1 with a probability distribution G(.). The randomness reﬂects changing
permits allocation rules by the regulator impacting the second period per-
mits allocation. Only at the beginning of the second period does the ﬁrm
know its permits allocation. Thus, at time t + 1, the ﬁrm knows its amount
of permits ˆ Pt+1 endowed and may decide on its inputs uses, production level
and associated emissions of pollutants. However, at time t, this amount is
not known with certainty. We assume here that the ﬁrm anticipates an av-
erage amount of permits distributed during the second period equal to ¯ Pt+1.
Thus, when there is uncertainty on the second period allocation, the ex-













The choice of the ﬁrm indeed follows two steps. In a ﬁrst step, the ﬁrm
chooses St and Xt by taking into account the uncertainty over the total
number of permits distributed in the future. In a second step, the ﬁrm
chooses Xt+1 and Pt+1 with Pt+1 ≤ ˆ Pt+1+St given its choices during the ﬁrst
period. Let us solve this program by backward induction.






F(Xt+1,Pt+1) − Rt+1Xt+1 + qt+1( ˆ Pt+1 + St − Pt+1)
o o
The ﬁrst order conditions are:
FXt+1 − Rt+1 = 0 (7)
and
FPt+1 − qt+1 = 0 (8)
We then obtain the level of proﬁt during the second period, ˜ π?
t+1 as a
function of the permits allocation ˆ Pt+1 and the bank St:
˜ π?
t+1( ˆ Pt+1) = F(X?
t+1( ˆ Pt+1,St),P ?
t+1( ˆ Pt+1,St)) − Rt+1X?
t+1( ˆ Pt+1,St)
+qt+1( ˆ Pt+1 + St − P ?
t+1( ˆ Pt+1,St))










The optimality conditions are:
FXt = Rt (9)
FPt − βE[qt+1] = 0 (10)
Combining eq.(8) and (10), we obtain an expected condition similar to
the case without uncertainty, i.e.:
−FPt(Xt, ¯ Pt − St) + βEFPt+1(Xt+1, ˜ Pt+1 + St)) = 0 (11)
Without a variation of the level of uncertainty, the ﬁrm’s behavior is
simply based on the expected proﬁt and we derive similar results to Section
2.1. Thus, it appears important to investigate the consequences of a change
in the risk level associated with the second period permits allocation. To this
purpose, we consider an increase in risk in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1971) and study the eﬀects of this change in the probability distribution
on the ﬁrm’s banking and inputs consumption choices. The eﬀects of the
variation of the risk associated to the banking variable S lead to the following
result:
Proposition 1 For a given level of inputs, in response to an increase in
risk in the sense of the mean preserving spread, the banking of pollution
permits by the ﬁrm increases (decreases) if and only if the third derivative
of the production function with respect to the emissions, FPPP, is positive
10(negative).
Proof. Considering a given level of inputs, X?
t , X?
t+1, from eq.(11) with
the distribution of probability, G(.), we obtain:
−FPt(X
?
t , ¯ Pt − S
G
t ) + βEGFPt+1(X
?
t+1, ˜ Pt+1 + S
G




Considering a distribution of probability K(.), where K(.) is a mean preserv-
ing spread of G(.), eq.(11) gives:
−FPt(X
?
t , ¯ Pt − S
K
t ) + βEKFPt+1(X
?
t+1, ˜ Pt+1 + S
K




Using the second order condition of the optimization program, we have SK
t >
SG
t if and only if HK(SG












where h(S) = FPt+1(X?
t+1, ˜ Pt+1+S). This inequality is veriﬁed if and only






The conditions on the third derivative of the production function with
11respect to emissions indeed relate to the study of the concavity of this func-
tion. It is worth noting the similarity between this condition and the con-
ditions associated with the third derivative of utility obtained by introduced
by Kimball (1990)8 when studying individuals’ risk behavior while, in our
framework, ﬁrms are risk-neutral.
Concerning the eﬀects of the variation of the risk level associated with





Thus, the variation sense of the input quantity Xt depends on the sign of
the crossed derivative of the production function (assuming that FXX < 0).
We obtain the following result:
Proposition 2 When banking permits is an increasing function of risk, if
the goods used in the production function are complements (substitutes),
FXP > 0 (FXP < 0), then the ﬁrm increases (decreases) its inputs con-
sumption, X, as a consequence of an increase in risk.
In this section, we have demonstrated that the variations of ﬁrm’s inputs
choices and banked permits depend on its characteristic production func-
tion with respect to concavity. Firms with heterogeneous characteristics on
their third derivative may adopt dramatically diﬀerent behaviors in terms of
banked permits. We explore in the next section whether heterogeneous ﬁrms
may pool risks through the intermediation of an agency managing the per-
mits. If such an option exists, then we investigate what may be the optimal
risk sharing rule between ﬁrms.
8See the notion of prudence.
123 Risk Management Strategies
Let us detail ﬁrst the risks pooling behavior and second the optimal risk-
sharing rule between ﬁrms.
3.1 The Pooling Behavior
In order to study a risk sharing rule between ﬁrms, we assume that in partial
equilibrium there exists N ﬁrms and Θ states of nature9. Note ¯ P iθ
t+1 the
permits allocation that ﬁrm i receives in the state of nature θ, θ ≤ θ ≤ θ,


















t+1 + qt+1( ¯ P iθ
t+1 + Si






The pooling behavior implies the introduction of a cooperation agency10
between ﬁrms which is responsible to maximize the sum of ﬁrms’ proﬁts
whatever their states of nature. This agency will thus take into account the










t + St (13)
9By considering a partial equilibrium framework, we assume that the N ﬁrms constitute
a sub-sample of the ﬁrms subject to the pollution permits market.
10This agency may either correspond to a ”parent agency” with N subsidiaries or to a
centralization of production decisions. This latter type of pooling corresponds to common











t+1, ∀θ ∈ Θ (14)


















t+1 ≡ ¯ P
θ, ∀θ ∈ Θ (15)
The agency’s program consists in maximizing the sum of proﬁts by choos-
ing ﬁrms’ inputs levels (Xi
t and Xiθ
t+1) as well as the use of pollution permits
(P i
t and P iθ
t+1) for all states of nature . As the agency takes into account the
sum of ﬁrms’ proﬁts, and given that the sum of permits sales must be equal




























subject to the constraint in eq.(15). Noting λθ the Lagrange multiplier
of the constraint in the state θ, we obtain the following ﬁrst order conditions


























































We may identify Borch’s condition applied to ﬁrms and the reciprocity
principle. At the optimum, the marginal rates of technical substitution of









































This condition is similar to Borch (1962) concerning agents’ marginal
rates of substitutions between two states of nature.
From the set of optimality conditions (eq. (16) to (20)), we obtain an
implicit function Γiθ between the number of permits allocated to each ﬁrm
in a given state of nature and the total amounts of permits distributed for









The permits distributed by the agency depend on the aggregated sum of
permits available in the economy over the two periods. If a change arises in
ﬁrms’ permits allocation rules, and without uncertainty on the total number
of permits allocated during the second period, we obtain the following result:
For any given set of decisions of the regulator concerning ﬁrms’ permits
allocation criteria during the second period, the re-allocation of permits by
the agency is Pareto-optimal for ﬁrms.
The expected ﬁrms’ proﬁts are similar to the case without uncertainty
where the agency is in charge of redistributing the total number of permits
available in the economy. If the agency only knows the total number of









be able to redistribute the total number of permits , ¯ ¯ Pt + ¯ ¯ Pt+1, during each
period for any change in permits allocation rules enforced by the regulator.
In this context, the agency is able to smooth changes in permits allocation
between the two periods instead of ﬁrms. When Borch’s condition is met,
this allocation is also Pareto-optimal.
However, as we detail in the next section, if the uncertainty concerns
the total amount of permits distributed during the second period, then the
risk-sharing agency will only be able to enforce an optimal risk-sharing rule
associated with permits holdings.
3.2 The Optimal Risk-Sharing Rule
For a given state of nature , θ, we may deduce from the optimality conditions


















Based on eq.(17), the inputs X during the second period may be expressed







Plugging these functions in eq.(23), we obtain a relationship between



















t+1) = 0 (25)
In order to derive the optimal risk-sharing rule, we study the variations of
16ﬁrms’ permits allocations as a function of the variation of the second period
permits bank. We consider the permits allocation constraint in eq.(15) in


















































t+1, the total allocation for each state
of nature, and we obtain:
¯ ¯ P
θ1













Using eq.(25) and the implicit function theorem, we deﬁne, for each state
of nature, a relationship, g(.), between ﬁrms’ second period permits alloca-



































j the elasticity of the marginal productivity of the environmental
variable as a function of ﬁrm’s i production with respect to the variation of
the number of permits:
σ
θ






we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 3 If the total permits bank during the second period is random,















When the initial global permits allocation in the state of nature θ in-
creases, the ﬁnal second period permits allocation in this state increases
proportionally to the elasticity of the marginal productivity with respect to
the environmental variable (the stock of pollution). This sharing condition
also takes into account the sensitivity of the ﬁrm’s marginal productivity to
the number of permits.
Having detailed in Section 2 the consequences of uncertainty on ﬁrms’
banking behavior and in Section 3 the rationale for risk-sharing between
ﬁrms, we examine in the next section whether these theoretical predictions
meet ﬁrms’ actual behavior on the European carbon market.
4 Empirical Evidence
This section hinges on the recent development of the EU ETS during 2005-
2007 to discuss empirically the main theoretical ﬁndings. The early experi-
18ence of the world’s largest greenhouse gases ETS to date indeed allows us
to shed some light on (i) the banking behavior at the installation level as
detailed in Section 2, and (ii) the permits pooling behavior at the group level
as highlighted in Section 3.
We use Reuters Carbon Market Data11 to provide a qualitative discus-
sion of these theoretical ﬁndings. From the 800 companies included in this
database, we identify 7 companies that allow us to shed some light on the
banking and pooling behaviors. Our case-studies are divided in three sub-
samples: ﬁrms with the highest pollution permits shortages at the group
level, ﬁrms with the highest pollution permits surpluses at the group level
and the highest emitter of CO2 on the market. We focus our comments
on the number of allowances banked forward at the installation level and
the presumed pooling behavior at the group level as detailed respectively in
Sections 2 and 3. All tables and ﬁgures may be found in the Appendix.
4.1 The Banking Behavior at the Installation Level
On the EU ETS, the political uncertainty regarding the second period per-
mits allocation is linked to the negotiation of the second National Allocation
Plans (NAPs) between Member States (MS) and the European Commission
(EC). This situation ﬁts well the theoretical framework developed in Section
2. The uncertainty concerns indeed the exact amount of permits being al-
located from 2008 onwards, since the EC announced during Phase I its will
to enforce stricter allocation rules for Phase II. The goal of the EC essen-
11Available at http://www.carbonmarketdata.com. To the purpose of our empirical sec-
tion, we exploit from the Reuters Carbon Market Data the compilation of 2005-2007
veriﬁed emissions between subsidiaries and parent companies that was accurate as of May
2008.
19tially consists in enacting stricter validation criteria for MS to create a real
scarcity of pollution permits, and thus foster ﬁrms’ investment in depolluting
technologies and internal CO2 emissions abatement eﬀorts.
The variation of banked allowances between Phase I (2005-2007) and
Phase II (2008-2012) corresponds to the 2008 compliance result which will
be disclosed by the EC by mid-May 200912. Thus, we choose to focus our
comments on the variation of banked permits by ﬁrms linked to the variation
of the global level of regulatory uncertainty during 2005-2007. By many
aspects, Phase I may be considered as a ”warm-up” period for the EU ETS
since several key provisions13 of this newly created market were characterized
by abrupt decision changes. By using this approach, we intend to provide
an empirical discussion of the theoretical results regarding the banking of
permits that corresponds to the early development of the European carbon
market.
The risk underlying permits trading on the European carbon market is
linked to increasing permits prices against which installations need to form
hedging strategies14, and the ﬁrm’s net short/long position that need to be
carefully managed to save penalty costs (Buchner and Ellerman (2008)). An
installation is deﬁned as net short (long) if the number of veriﬁed emissions
is superior (inferior) to the number of allocated allowances during the com-
12Moreover, due to institutional fungibility between the EU ETS and the Kyoto Protocol
as of 2008, the possibility to transfer banked allowances from Phase I to Phase II has been
restricted by all MS. For an extensive discussion of the inter-period ban on banking in the
EU ETS, see Alberola and Chevallier (2007).
13Such as allocation criteria or banking provisions.
14See Ielpo et al. (2008) for an extensive discussion based on increasing futures prices
over 2008-2012. We do not further comment this type of risk in the remainder of the
article.
20pliance period. An installation with a short (long) position may buy (sell)
allowances in order to be in compliance (make proﬁts). If the installation
does not match its mandatory emissions target with the corresponding num-
ber of allowances during the compliance period, it needs to pay back one
permits plus a penalty15 during the next period.
On the demand side, the volume of CO2 emissions at the installation
level depends on economic activity, weather events and other energy market
prices (Mansanet-Batallet et al. (2007), Alberola et al. (2008a), Alberola
et al. (2008b), Newbery (2008)). On the supply side, the allocation of
permits in the EU ETS during Phase I followed the grandfathering principle,
which allocates permits freely based on business-as-usual emissions. If a
ﬁrm encounters an uncertainty as modelled in Section 2 and goes beyond its
emissions forecasts during the current allocation period, then it is basically
left with two choices: either use banked permits or go on the market to buy
permits.
Given the underlying assumption of our model that permits trading has
already occurred between ﬁrms, we investigate the changes in banked permits
at the installation level that occured in a context of regulatory uncertainty on
the EU ETS during 2005-2007. Banking behaviors greatly vary between the 7
companies that belong to our case-studies. In the sub-sample of ﬁrms which
record the highest permits surpluses, we remark net banking patterns for the
largest installations in terms of allocation for ArcelorMittal (Figures 1 to 3,
Table 1) and Dalkia (Figures 4 to 6, Tables 2-4), as well as for Eesti Energia’s
installation (Figures 7 to 9, Table 5). This comment applies especially for
installations in the combustion sector which seem to have beneﬁted from
windfall proﬁts during the NAPs I allocation process. In the sub-sample
15Equal to 40= C per unit during 2005-2007 and 100= C per unit during 2008-2012.
21of ﬁrms which record the highest permits shortages, we observe asymmetric
banking (borrowing) patterns for Enel (Figures 10 to 12, Table 5), E.ON
(Figures 13 to 15, Tables 6-7) and Union Fenosa (Figures 19 to 21, Table 10)
depending on whether those installations were characterized by a net long
(short) position during 2005-2007. The same comment apply to our last sub-
sample of ﬁrms for RWE, the highest emitter of CO2 on the market (Figures
16 to 18, Tables 8-9).
Based on the visual inspection of the data, we have highlighted in this
section a wide variation in the amount of banked permits at the installa-
tion level during 2005-2007. Three kinds of arguments may explain these
variations between ﬁrms. First, diﬀerentiated allocation rules were enforced
by the regulator between EU ETS sectors that aﬀect ﬁrms’ permits supply.
Second, unforeseen economic activity events may impact ﬁrms’ production
levels and their permits demand. Third, these heterogeneous behaviors in
terms of banked permits may come from the political uncertainty described
earlier regarding banking provisions and NAPs II. The latter argument is in
line with the theoretical framework regarding the eﬀects of political decision
changes on ﬁrms’ banking behavior derived in Sections 2 and 3. This ﬁrst
step of the inspection of the data therefore brings us to a more detailed anal-
ysis analysis of the potential for permits pooling by the parent company in
the next section.
4.2 The Pooling Behavior at the Group-Level
Let us detail ﬁrst the rationale behind risks pooling, and second the actual
behavior of the ﬁrms contained in our sample.
To our best knowledge, only Alberola et al. (2008) evoke the existence
of pooling behavior in the EU ETS. In this article, we have detailed the
22economic intuitions behind it. Before investigating the pooling behavior em-
pirically, it is worth emphasizing that the Community Independent Transac-
tion Log (CITL)16, which oversees all national registries, displays extensive
information at the installation level concerning allocation and veriﬁed emis-
sions. However, not all registries have been connected to date, and the CITL
contains raw data that needs to be reorganized between subsidiaries and par-
ent companies17. Hence, we do not aim at an exhaustive discussion on this
topic, but rather at introducing empirical perspectives that are relevant to
our theoretical results.
On the EU ETS, pooling behaviors may emerge at the group level in
order to save the cost of purchasing permits. The economic logic of such
an argument unfolds as follows: if there exist both types of net short and
net long subsidiaries, the parent company may transfer allowances internally
between them so that the net position of the parent company is globally
in compliance. Thus, the exposure to the risk of permits shortage during
compliance periods may be reduced by this intra re-allocation of permits.
This type of behavior is close to the theoretical ﬁnding detailed in Section
3 with the role of the agency pooling risks. This logic holds only if there is
an alternate of net short and net long installations at the group level, that
is why we detail several cases that may apply.
Among the three ﬁrms in our sample that are in a net short position,
Union Fenosa exhibits in Table 10 the largest shortage by 7.3M European
16Available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets/, cited May 2008.
17For a detailed analysis on this compilation of emissions data at the group level, see
Trotignon and McGuiness (2007) and Trotignon et al. (2008). As another preliminary
remark, note it is not yet technically possible to track permits exchanges at the European
level, although each permit is marked with an unique identiﬁer, since this information will
only be disclosed publicly after 5 years of permit trading in the EU ETS.
23Union Allowances (EUAs)18 in 2007. Out of 12 installations, 9 are in a
short position which may only be compensated internally by 2M EUAs in
surplus. Thus, the pooling of allowances by the parent company allows to
reduce the risk of permits shortage by 25% for some, but not all, subsidiaries.
The visual inspection of the data in Figures 19 to 21 reveals that three
installations are especially short of permits over 2005-2007. Next, we turn
our attention to E.ON which records in Tables 6 and 7 a net short position
of 2.7M EUAs. 31 out of 89 installations encounter a permits shortage, and
the potential for permits transfer at the group level amounts to 1.6M EUAs.
Hence, the risk pooling strategy by the parent company may save the costs
of permits purchase on the market by 60%. The distribution of subsidiaries
in Figure 13 to 15 also reveals a strong dispersion in terms of size, with one
installation of 1M allocated allowances being consistently short over 2005-
2007. In Table 5, Enel records a net deﬁcit of allowances by 1.5M in 2007.
5 out of 9 installations are net short, which may only be compensated by
another subsidiary by 0.05M EUAs. Figures 10 to 12 conﬁrms this analysis,
with most installations being net short in 2007. From this sub-sample of ﬁrms
with permits shortages, our analysis has conﬁrmed the potential for risk-
sharing and thereby the pooling behavior at the group level that constitutes
one of the main ﬁnding in Section 3. Let us now examine another sub-sample
of ﬁrms with permits surpluses.
Among the three ﬁrms in our sample that are in a net long position,
ArcelorMittal stands out as holding the largest surplus of allowances. Indeed,
as shown in Table 1, it is net long by 18.9M EUAs during the compliance year
2007. There appears to be little room for permits pooling within subsidiaries.
Only 2 out of 25 installations are in a slightly short position, which may
18One EUA is equal to one ton of CO2 emitted in the atmosphere.
24easily be counterbalanced by permits reallocation from other installations
within the group. This situation is conﬁrmed by the visual inspection of
the data in Figures 1 to 3. Overall, the parent company is a net seller
on the permits market. In Table 4, Dalkia also exhibits a large surplus of
2.4M EUAs in 2007. 4 out of 125 installations are net short, which supposes
similarly that their deﬁcit may be compensated internally by the parent
company, thereby covering the risk of permits shortage for its subsidiaries.
From Figures 4 to 6, one may remark that the distribution of installations is
very heterogeneous with two installations above 1M of allocated allowances
holding substantive surpluses. On a smaller scale, Eesti Energia displays in
Table 5 a net long position of 0.27M EUAs in 2007 for one installation being
reported in the Reuters Carbon Market Database. Without commenting
further the possibility of pooling risks, Figures 7 to 9 reveals that this permits
surplus has been increasing from 2005 to 2007. This second sub-sample of
ﬁrms has conﬁrmed the liquidity of the permits market in terms of extra-
allowances available for trading during each compliance period. Given this
high level of heterogeneity between ﬁrms, if parent companies are still in a net
short position after pooling allowances internally, they may buy allowances
on the market to be globally in compliance.
Finally, we comment the case of RWE which is the largest CO2 emitter
in the current European system with 128M EUAs veriﬁed emissions in 2007.
From Tables 8 and 9, we observe that RWE is in a net short position by 8.6
M EUAs. 21 out of 73 installations encounter an permits shortage, which
may be compensated internally by the parent company by 2.8M EUAs, i.e.
33% of the total permits shortage. The distribution of installations displayed
in Figures 16 to 18 reveal that RWE gathers very large installations, with
4 installations being allocated above 1.5M EUAs in 2007. One installation
25above 2M EUAs allocated records a net shortage of allowances in 2007. Our
analysis has therefore conﬁrmed the potential for permits pooling between
subsidiaries by the parent company, which is conform to the theoretical ﬁnd-
ing on the optimal risk-sharing rule enforced by the agency derived in Section
3.
5 Conclusion
In this article, we have shown that, once permits trading between ﬁrms has
occurred, the presence of uncertainty regarding political decision changes in
permits allocation rules may provide incentives for ﬁrms to bank permits in
order to hedge against this risk. The conditions under which risk-neutral
ﬁrms hedge their risk by banking permits is linked to the third derivative
of the production function. This condition is similar to the condition under
which individuals adopt a prudent behavior19. Besides, we have characterized
an optimal risk-sharing rule when the uncertainty is associated either to the
repartition of permits between ﬁrms, or to the global permits allocation.
This rule depends on ﬁrms’ technological characteristics, and more precisely
on the concavity of the production function with respect to pollution.
As for the empirical evidence, we have selected three types of ﬁrms op-
erating on the EU ETS characterized by the highest allowances surpluses,
the highest allowances shortages and the highest CO2 emissions level on the
market. Thus, we obtain a sample of 7 ﬁrms out of 800 included in the
Reuters Carbon Market Database. These case studies allow us to provide
some qualitative insights of the theoretical results. First, the investigation of
the banking behavior has revealed asymmetric banking (borrowing) patterns
19i.e. the study of the positive third derivative of the utility function
26at the installation level as a consequence of varying net long (short) positions
during 2005-2007. Second, the investigation of the pooling behavior has con-
ﬁrmed the potential for internal permits transfers between subsidiaries at
the group level. The former result is consistent with what was expected from
Section 2, i.e. to observe a variation of the number of permits banked by
ﬁrms in reaction to political uncertainty concerning Phase II of the EU ETS.
The latter result illustrates the economic logic derived in Section 3, i.e. the
parent company acts as the agency to introduce an optimal risks-sharing rule
between subsidiaries.
From a regulatory viewpoint, the management of the environment through
the introduction of pollution permits implies that ﬁrms have the ability to
bank permits in order to hedge the risks linked to political decision changes.
The banking of permits is not motivated here by adaptation concerns to en-
vironmental constraints, but by the need to counter-balance political risks
attached with the introduction of pollution permits systems. Our analysis
has therefore conﬁrmed the key role played by banking provisions in order
to cope with the potential political uncertainty related to the creation of
pollution permits markets.
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40Figure 1: Distributed Allowances and Veriﬁed Emissions for ArcelorMittal in 2005
from Reuters Carbon Market Data
Figure 2: Distributed Allowances and Veriﬁed Emissions for ArcelorMittal in 2006
from Reuters Carbon Market Data
Figure 3: Distributed Allowances and Veriﬁed Emissions for ArcelorMittal in 2007
from Reuters Carbon Market DataFigure 4: Distributed Allowances and Veriﬁed Emissions for Dalkia in 2005 from
Reuters Carbon Market Data
Figure 5: Distributed Allowances and Veriﬁed Emissions for Dalkia in 2006 from
Reuters Carbon Market Data
Figure 6: Distributed Allowances and Veriﬁed Emissions for Dalkia in 2007 from
Reuters Carbon Market DataFigure 7: Distributed Allowances and Veriﬁed Emissions for Eesti Energia in 2005
from Reuters Carbon Market Data
Figure 8: Distributed Allowances and Veriﬁed Emissions for Eesti Energia in 2006
from Reuters Carbon Market Data
Figure 9: Distributed Allowances and Veriﬁed Emissions for Eesti Energia in 2007
from Reuters Carbon Market DataFigure 10: Distributed Allowances and Veriﬁed Emissions for Enel in 2005 from
Reuters Carbon Market Data
Figure 11: Distributed Allowances and Veriﬁed Emissions for Enel in 2006 from
Reuters Carbon Market Data
Figure 12: Distributed Allowances and Veriﬁed Emissions for Enel in 2007 from
Reuters Carbon Market DataFigure 13: Distributed Allowances and Veriﬁed Emissions for Eon in 2005 from
Reuters Carbon Market Data
Figure 14: Distributed Allowances and Veriﬁed Emissions for Eon in 2006 from
Reuters Carbon Market Data
Figure 15: Distributed Allowances and Veriﬁed Emissions for Eon in 2007 from
Reuters Carbon Market DataFigure 16: Distributed Allowances and Veriﬁed Emissions for RWE in 2005 from
Reuters Carbon Market Data
Figure 17: Distributed Allowances and Veriﬁed Emissions for RWE in 2006 from
Reuters Carbon Market Data
Figure 18: Distributed Allowances and Veriﬁed Emissions for RWE in 2007 from
Reuters Carbon Market DataFigure 19: Distributed Allowances and Veriﬁed Emissions for Union Fenosa in
2005 from Reuters Carbon Market Data
Figure 20: Distributed Allowances and Veriﬁed Emissions for Union Fenosa in
2006 from Reuters Carbon Market Data
Figure 21: Distributed Allowances and Veriﬁed Emissions for Union Fenosa in
2007 from Reuters Carbon Market Data